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In contrast to what the title suggests, this book is not
primarily about politics and gender, but about social
inequality and the welfare state. At first glance, this
volume seems to be little different from Esping-
Andersen’s earlier books. Yet it is, and the main novelty
concerns the author’s effort to bring in demography in
order to understand how inequalities accumulate over
the life course. The book starts out with the argument
that research on income inequality has exaggerated the
influence of globalization and technology, all the while
neglecting the impact of massive shifts in demography.
These shifts primarily relate to women’s changing
behaviour with respect to education, marriage, family,
domestic work, and career dedication. In Esping-
Andersen’s words, we have experienced nothing less
than a ‘female revolution’ as women’s life course has
become increasingly masculinized. Not only is it the case
that new cohorts of women increasingly embrace a
lifelong commitment to employment. The transform-
ation also spills over to decisions regarding marriage—
couples becoming increasingly similar in terms of human
capital—, fertility and the domestic sphere, where
women have significantly reduced and men have little
by little increased their investment in home production.
However, the ‘revolutionary’ change in women’s role
is still incomplete and contemporary societies thus are,
according to Esping-Andersen, suspended between two
equilibria. A first equilibrium crystallizes around the
traditional nuclear family with the male as the bread-
winner and the female as the homemaker. Post-war
classics considered this model of strong gender special-
ization as the End of History: for Talcott Parsons it was
the maturation of the modernization process, for Gary
Becker the most efficient organization of family welfare.
Yet, this seemingly stable arrangement has come under
pressure from a rival model: Women’s quest for higher
education, economic autonomy, and life-time dedication
to paid work has profoundly reshaped family life and
given rise to what Esping-Andersen calls the ‘gender-
equality equilibrium’. Its emergence is illustrated, on the
one hand, by women’s improved educational attainment
and increasing labour market attachment, and on the
other by husbands’ growing contribution to housework.
The gender-equality equilibrium is steadily expanding
in the Western World. Yet Esping-Andersen’s analysis of
time use and income data recalls that it is far from being
dominant. The post-war male–breadwinner, female–
housewife equilibrium continues to describe the life of
about a third of Americans and Southern Europeans and
perhaps a tenth of Scandinavians. Crucially, a large
fraction of people falls in-between the two equilibria.
While they have left behind the Ancien Re´gime of
clear-cut gender division, they have not yet fully
embraced a model of dual careers and shared home
production. Accordingly, they are caught in an unstable
equilibrium, which is not only based on unclear
normative standards but also associated with suboptimal
outcomes, among others much lower actual than desired
fertility. More importantly, and this is the book’s key
argument, as long as the transformation towards gender
equality is incomplete, this very process is bound to
increase inequalities.
Why should the evolution towards greater gender
equality lead to social polarization? The reason is that
the dual-career norm has primarily been adopted by
women from the privileged classes, making it largely a
‘middle-class affair’ (p. 169). Hence, highly educated
women have increased their labour supply to a much
greater degree than low-educated women since the
1980s—an evolution that has significantly contributed
to the rise of income inequality. In parallel, marital
similarity in terms of social class has grown as women in
higher grade occupations increasingly marry men em-
ployed in similar high-status jobs. Not surprisingly then,
these high-skilled double-earner couples race ahead of
the rest, whereas joblessness is widespread among
couples at the bottom of the education distribution.
The female revolution may thus reduce inequality
within the household, but increase inequality between
households. Worryingly, this demography-driven growth
in income inequality also spills over to children’s
mobility prospects. Esping-Andersen shows that inequal-
ity in parents’ monetary and time investment in their
children widened over the last decades. Time-use data
from Denmark, Spain, and the United States suggest that
highly educated parents dedicate a fourth to a third
more time to their children than low-educated parents.
The discrepancies in life chances thus seem to widen
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along a series of linked factors: family income, spending
on children, and both the quantity and quality of
parenting.
This troublesome evolution calls for welfare state
reform—a project whose contours Esping-Andersen
outlines in the book’s second half. The reform should
ensure that children have equal life chances and simul-
taneously bridge Europe’s large gap between the desired
and the actual number of children. To achieve these two
goals, it is paramount that motherhood be reconciled
with employment in such a way as to minimize women’s
loss of life-time income due to children. This implies
paid maternity-cum-parental leave with job security,
generous child allowances, an individual taxation regime,
and access to non-family home help for the elderly. The
corner stone of Esping-Andersen’s reform agenda is,
however, access to affordable quality childcare. Based on
recent findings that cognitive and socio-emotional
foundations of learning are laid in early childhood,
Esping-Andersen argues that the roots of unequal life
chances are buried in the pre-school ages—all the more
so because schools are ill-equipped to remedy a bad
start. Accordingly, welfare states need to invest in
families with children. This investment primarily con-
sists—alongside government transfers aimed at eradicat-
ing child poverty—in universal access to childcare.
Esping-Andersen thus points out the paradox that
family well-being in modern society presupposes ‘defa-
milization’: Where external welfare state arrangements
help families to care for their children and their elderly,
inter-generational ties as measured with the frequency of
interactions between grandparents, parents, and children
seem stronger and fathers’ time investment into their
offspring greater.
State subsidies for universal day-care coverage do not
come cheap: Denmark’s universal day-care system for
children under six years costs an equivalent of almost
two per cent of GDP. A frequently advocated solution is
to downsize pensions in order to redistribute public
resources from the elderly towards the young. In the
book’s final chapter, Esping-Andersen convincingly
argues that this is an intellectual fallacy. To begin with,
pushing a part of the retired back into poverty simply
shifts the financial burden from the state towards
families. Moreover, if budget cuts also concern public
services for the elderly, greater demand for familial care
will translate into lower female employment and hence
less tax revenues. Most importantly, the warning of an
impending clash between generations ignores the large
extent of intra-generational inequality: ‘death is not
democratic: the rich live far longer than the poor and
this produces huge inequalities within each retirement
generation’ (p. 147). Instead, Esping-Andersen proposes
a series of more equitable measures to come to grips
with the costs of population ageing. More generally, he
insists that securing pensions in 2050 essentially depends
on the productivity of the then active cohorts.
Accordingly, ‘retirement reform must begin with
babies’ (p. 162). The idea is that investment into early
childhood yields high returns: Quality day care and early
schooling not only boost women’s labour supply and
thus reduce child poverty. More crucially, they also
improve and homogenize children’s cognitive stimula-
tion and educational attainment and thus raise future
productive potential.
Hence, the macro-economic costs of investing in
children seem bearable. In contrast, the absence of
welfare state support for children may be costly in the
long run. It not only leaves rising inequalities unchecked,
but also complicates the reconciliation of motherhood
with work. The result is not very attractive: too few
children, too few hours worked by women, too narrow a
tax base, and persisting inequalities in children’s life
chances.
With The Incomplete Revolution, Esping-Andersen has
embarked on the ambitious project of bringing in the
family to explain unequal life chances. By and large, this
enterprise is crowned with success. Three qualities of the
book are particularly noteworthy. First, there is a
considerable amount of conceptual originality as the
author brings together the literature from sociology,
demography, and economics. Second, Esping-Andersen
tries to empirically support his arguments whenever
possible; his narrative thus rests on countless statistical
analyses of income data, time-use surveys, household
panels, and Programme for International Student
Assessment (PISA) scores. Finally, the book strives to
be directly relevant to policy-making; hence, it lucidly
engages with ongoing political debates and, unlike many
other scholars, does so in a language easily accessible to
practitioners and undergraduate students.
One major criticism of this book relates to the
overwhelming weight Esping-Andersen places on early
childhood as the crucial period when inequalities are
formed. Compared with the massive effect attributed to
childcare, the long years spent in the educational system
are virtually blended out. The idea that the die of
inequality is already cast in pre-school years seems not
only unappealing from a philosophical point of view.
More importantly, it also takes little note of the research
showing the powerful effect that parents’ class has on
adolescents’ educational choices independent of their
school performance (e.g. Erikson and Jonsson, 1996).
Likewise, the finding that social origin is more closely
linked with educational attainment at younger rather
than older ages clearly suggests that schooling affects
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equality above and beyond the pre-school years
(e.g. Blossfeld and Shavit, 1993). Yet, despite the weak
case it makes regarding educational systems, there is little
doubt that The Incomplete Revolution strongly enhances
our understanding of the making and unmaking of
unequal life chances. And last but not least, it is a
surprisingly entertaining read.
Daniel Oesch
Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lausanne,
Switzerland
daniel.oesch@unil.ch
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